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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
NOBUMICHI KAZURA, "' * *,
FRANKE. ROBERTS, HAROLD F.
ROBERTS, BETH PURDUE, ROBERTA BERREY and CAROL
BUNNELL,

Case No.
11011

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND
MOTION TO STRIKE
If the Brief filed by County counsel herein is not violative of every norm of appellate brief writing, it may be
only an inadvertence. The Brief is so disto:rited in its Statement not only of the facts but in argument as well, tllat
it does not calculate a review of the ma:tJter on the record
u1· within the rulings of the trial court. In its parts, Appellant's Brief contains an assortment of substantial irregularities, improper argument, statements dehors the recol'd and misstatements of the record. For the purpose of
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a Motion to Strike to be herein made, a few of the more
prominent deviations are noted below.
To begin with, the first three and one-half pages of
counsel's Brief on ''Disposition in Lower Court" is a self.
righteous and inaccurate argument, without record cita;tion
whatsoever, on the events at the first trial leading to a mistrial order of Judge Elton. The great bulk of County
counsel's Statement of Facts are not the facts of trial at
all. but rather sheer argument. 2 The dirufribe is illustrated
on page 9 of counsel's Statement where it is represented as
fact that:
1

"It is at least problematical, whether Defen.
dant's highly imaginative appraisal ·would have
taken the jury from a realistic valuation of the
Hotel property, but for, a deliberately posed highly
prejudicial question of defendant's counsel, asked
of plaintiff's witness, Max Jensen, a:s to whether
the county's valuation of the Colonial Hotel for tix
purposes was not $130,000, accompanied by a flour·
1

Even if this soliloquy of counsel were remotely accurate (whic:h it is
not) it cannot be considered in the appeal. Watkins v. Simonds. 14
U. 2d 406, 385 P. 2d 154 (1963). Nevertheless, this invented argu
ment and statement of Mr. Nielson thereafter serves as the basis for
his Statement of Facts at page 9 and for Point II of his Brief with
respect to the propriety of cross examination by the landowners as
to the validity and consistency of income figures used by the County's
experts. Such tactics are ill-fated in this Court.

2Sec pages 6 and 7 of counsel's Brief wherein the owners' witnesses
are said to have "ignored" previous experience on the condemned
property and to have made "completely hypothetical projections of
an imaginary operation". Appellant then proceeds on page 7 to use
his own roncocted "hypothetical" resume of the landowners' expert»
totally unsupported by the record.
And on page 8 of counsel's Statement of Facts, a sale of prov
erty excluded from evidence by Judge Elton is self-styled by counoel
as comparable "probably more than any hotel anywhere in the
u·nr/d".

a
ish of a yellow card which defendant's counsel
handed to the Clerk for marking (R. 865, 831, 868
and 874). Counsel of course kneiv that Judge Elton
had ruled that such evidence was inadmissible at the
previous trial." 3
Clear misstatements and misrepresentations of the record are made at several stages of Appellant's Brief!
As noted in F. N. # 1, the record citation does not support in the
slightest this vitriolic argument or that the owners' counsel "knew"
of an earlier ruling in an earlier trial. Indeed, there is no such record or ruling and Mr. Nielson's statement above is not only improper
and unsupported argument, but it is a patently false misrepresentation.
But this personal beratement of the landowners and their counsel was typical of County counsel's approach throughout the trial.
See counsel's closing argument to the jury where, without evidential basis and in the face of continuing admonishment of the trial
judge, the personal character of the owners was maligned and their
honesty and integrity as citizens questioned, where the owners' counsel was said to have intentionally retained unprofessional witnesses
to be brought before "a new and inexperienced jury" and where it
was said that the owners and their counsei were, by their evidence
in the case, trying to "steal" from the jurors who were taxpayers
(R. 809-813).

3

•On page 8 of the Brief, it is claimed that the sale of the Upland
Hotel was rejected by the trial court "in spite of testimony that the
beneficiaries were acting at arms length". There is clearly nothmg
in the record to even suggest that the beneficiaries were acting at all
in the matter, much less acting at arms length (R. 672-674). Rather,
the testimony strictly shows that the sale was from one party, as
trustee, to himself, as trustee for another (R. 533-534).
On page 9 of Appellant's Brief, County counsel indicates what
the testimony of Owen Mc Ewan, former Salt Lake City Fireman
would have been if permitted to testify and a record citation is given
to that end. The record indicates no proffer as claimed by counsel
as to McEwan and indeed, no part of the record remotely supports
counsel's claim on the matter. Further, on page 6 of Appellant's
Brief, it is stated that the County appraiser determined the income
Producing potential of the condemned property by "comparative
analysis" and record citation is given. The record, itself, including
the noted citations, is quite to the contrary and indicates that the
county expert did not make a comparative analysis of room rentals
in other city hotels of similar class (R. 641, 1. 23-25).

4

These irregularities which ring throughout counsel's
Brief are capped by his almost unique disclosure of a personal conversation held by him with jurors after return of
the verdict. 5
This Court has served notice time and again that it
will not condone such a stuffing of the record by a party,
that it will not consider a self-invented argument in the
Statement of Facts and that it will, in its deliberations, disregard misrepresentations and misstatements of the record
such as have been above-noted in Appellant's Brief. Reliable
Furniture Co. v_ Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 14 U. 2d 169, 380 P. 2d 135 (1963); Bwndley v.
Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92 P. 2d 338 (1939); Rule 75(p) (2)(2) (d), U.R.C.P. Each of such failings noted herein ar~
subject to a motion to strike as impertinent and scunilou'
and Respondents so move this Court at this time to strike
such matters from Appellant's Brief and from the Appeal.
They should not be considered in the determination of thi;
Appeal and Respondents should not be required to respond
to the same_
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At no point does Appellant's Brief give any indication
of the amount of 01· difference in the value testimony at
trial. Nor dors Appellant c1•en suggest in its B1'1'ef t/11·
anwunt of the jul'y verdict or its relationsl11>p to the rct/11 1
evidence. Apparently, the assumption is that Appellant i<
to prevail in this appeal nn the basis of abstract thecm
5

"The jurors I talked to indicated that some o( the jury hdd out H
a tinw for a verdict of $130.000 based on thP taxes ;,lone_ The sih1-1
tion fairly sings with poetic justice" App. Br p. 2'.}

5
without regard to or in spite of the facts of trial. A synopsis of the proceedings in the lower court is accordingly in
order.
A mistrial (upon motion of the landowners) having
been declared at the end of three days of trial, the case was
reset and brought on for new trial on the issues of Just
Compensation in June, 1967 (R. 66-67, 71-72). The opinion
evidence of the parties on the market value of the Colonial
Hotel property under condemnation was :
Testimony of Loll for Landowners ------------$120,600.00

(R. 484)

Testimony of Roberts, one of the owners __ 130,000.00

(R. 384)

Testimony of Jensen for County ________ _______

(R. 677)

67,200.00

The jury verdict of Just Compensation, returned after
six and one-half days of trial, was a compromise of $97 ,500.00 ( R. 113).
Plaintiff's Motion for a new trial for claimed errors of
law was denied by Judge Elton on August 2, 1967 (R. 127).
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANT ON APPEAL
The County has appealed from the "Judgment of August 2, 1967" denying its Motion for a new trial." It requests
herein a new trial on the issues of Just Compensation and
further seeks an "advisory opinion" of sorts of this Court
"I hat Plaintiff has appealed from a non-final order and not from the
Judgment on the Verdict of June 21, 1967 (R. 120) has been made
the subject of a separate motion to dismiss brought by Respondents
hert•in.

6
on the use of the income approach in determining market
value.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As noted above, the impropriety of Appellant's Statement of Facits, makes it impossible for Respondents to c.:oncur with or except to such Statement. Respondents will
accordingly, set forth their own statement of evidentiary
fads as follows :
1. Condenined property. In March 1966, the Plaintiff
condemned Defendants' property to make \Vay fo1· the construction of the County Salt Palace ( R. 3). The property,
long known as the Colonial Hotel, was situated on the north
side of First South between West Temple and Fi1·st West
Sti·eets in Salt Lake City ( R. 235). Constructed around
1900 of sandstone foundation and two foot thick brick
walls, the Hotel stood five stories high ( R. 244, 353). The
ground floor served as a lobby and for business rentals
(cleaning shop and barber shop) ( R. 248-249) . The upper
floors consisted of some 24 apartment units and 70 hotel
rooms (R. 248). The basement had been occupied for many
years through the early 1960's by the Pagoda Restaurant
(R. 246-247).
2. Hotel Operrition. For many years, the patrons of
the Hotel came primarily from the city's oriental community, a fact which lent rental stability to the property (R.
433-404). Many rent01·s resided in the Hotel on a permanent basis (R. 249). In recent times, the Hotel averagrd
about 75';'(, occupancy rate (R. 248-249). The property
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ha<l been under an operating lease from the middle 1940's
to the late 1950's between Frank E. Roberts (father of the
other Defendants) as lessor, and Fuge Iwasaki (owner of
the Pagoda) as lessee (R. 370-371). Thereafter Frank sold
to his children and Fuge assigned his interest to one
Takanaka in the late 1950's and early 1960's (R. 366-369).
While there had been some adjustment of the base lease
rental of the Hotel upward toward market rental value
through the 1950's (R. 366-368), the lessee refused to pay
an otherwise justified rental increase after 1963 on the
Hotel (R. 365). The reason - the immirrency of the Salt
Palace Project in the area had caused merchants, residents
and Hotel patrons to vacate, move away and relocate, and
the vacancy rate in the Hotel substantially increased after
early 1963 (R. 393). The lease rental thus being paid was
not fair market rental (R. 481). By 1966, room rentals
were most marginal with all customary renters having gone
elsewhere because of the Salt Palace acquisitions in the two
city block section (R. 249).
3. Maintenance. All floors of the Hotel were served
by an automatic elevator, an unusual feature for an olderclass Hotel ( R. 355). A rewiring of the entire Hotel took
place in 1961 and 1962. The building had recently undergone a complete outside painting, and the interior rooms
had been refurbished from time to time ( R. 356-358) .
4. Market conditions. The buying activities of the
County and the L.D.S. Church (who combined their acqui' ~itions for the construction of the Salt Palace Project) had
their affect on the open market in the area (R. 436-439).
AftPr 1961, there were no sales whatsoever in the two block
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region between in di vi dual buyers and sellers ( R. 442-443).
Because of this condition and the impending· project, tenants could not be held, property could not be sold in a normal and competitive environment and a depressed market
resulted ( R. 439, 467, 519, 522). As a consequence, value
icitnesses on both sides looked outside the two block zone
of influence for mai·ket information in aniving at land
value opinion (R. 469, 646). Mr. Loll for the landowners
investigated and considered sales made to the L.D.S. Church
(R. 465-466, 470), but determined that because of the seller's relations with the Church, such transactions were not
typical of market value (R. 466). Nor did the County
value witness, Jensen, utilize any Church transactions.
5. Cost replacrmrnt appmach. By its Brief, Appellant would have us believe that the income approach to
market value was the exclusive method used by the landowners. Quite to the contrary, the cost replacement approach (cost new less depreciation and obsolescence) was
employed as a substantial index of market value under the
owners' case. Mr. Loll concluded that the condemned property, under the cost method, had a value of:
Market value of land . _______________ .$ 44,000.00
(by comparable sales # 1, 2, & 3)
Value of building _____ ___ _______ _________ 103,000.00
(cost new less depreciation)
Total value _____ __ ____ ___ ____ __ __ .$14 7,::;oo.oo
(R. 4h7-472, 482-48:1)
Such value opinion of" Loll, i·eceived in evidence with11ut ohicction h,- the f'ount\·, \\'<18 some $26,700.00 less than

that value determined by the income approach (R. 484) 7

Income approach. This approach was adopted as
an appraisement method by both sides. The Jifference in the case lay in the rental income tested, the landowners having analyzed the ground floor and room rentals
of the Hotel ( R. 453-455), and the County having relied on
leasehold income (R. 612-617). For the landowners, Mr.
Johns, MAI, and Mr. Loll testified that in determining market value of a hotel, the income approach is the recognized
method because of the following reasons :
6.

-

(a)

A hotel is a special use property which because
of wiring, plumbing, lay-out and design, is not
adaptable to other general uses (R. 761, 502).
The subject property had always been put to
such special use (R. 250).

(b)

Because of the substantial difference in size, location and type of each hotel in the city, there
was a lack of genuine comparable S1a:les of hotel
property (R. 449). No comparable hotel sales
were introduced by either party.

(c)

That the buyer and seller in the market, in determining a fair price for a hotel, rely substantially on the income approach and income potential of the property (R. 279, 481-482). On this
point, all witnesses were in agreement (R. 610,
762-764).

'Loll stated that the cost replacement approach was less reliable than
the income method on the subject property because of the difficulty
in estimating the proper amount of depreciation to a building some
70 years old (R. 445, 449).
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Johns and Loll for the owners stated that it is basic
appraisal practice in the evaluation of a hotel site to utilize
the income approach by estimating and determining prob
able room and ground floor rentals under typical and average management, deduct from such income estimate the
expenses (taxes, insurance, maintenance, utilities) inciJent
to the hotel, then deduct from the remaining rental income
that portion allocable to a reasonable return upon the land
investment, then capitalize the remaining income by a rate
of return that would be expected by an ordinary and prudent hotel buyer and seller ( R. 284-296, 453-465). Such capitalized figure, when added to the already determined land
value, reveals market value of the entire property by the
income approach (R. 296, 481-482, 484). Such method
(sometimes called a rental operating statement) 1:s the typ·
ical manner in which hotels are bought and sold in the
market (R. 279, 338, 376).

Mr. Loll for the condemnees utilized this appraise·
ment method. In estimating room and ground floor rentals,
he considered the actual experience and vacancy rate of the
Colonial Hotel, (R. 451, 453-454), the depressed rental mar·
ket in the area caused by the Salt Palace (R. 453, 481,
559), the room rentals vis-a-vis vacancy rates of at least
thee othe1· local hotels of comparable class to the Colonial
(R. 475-480), and a rent pattern which, in the appraiser's
judgment, represented sound and average management (R.
452-455, 473-475). Expenses against such determined gTos 0
rent were similarly based on a substantial survey of other ,
hotels and actual operating expenses of the Colonial, typical
management operation again being assumed (R. 475-480\ :
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One of the condemnees, himself a leading hotel ex!)€rt in
the City, testified as to average ground floor and room
rentals and expenses for the Colonial (R. 377-379).
While it was the fee interest in the Hotel which was
condemned, the County witness, Jensen, chose to appraise
only the leasehold rental as the sole basis for his income
approach (R. 612-613, 714-715). Jensen also used the actual expenses of the leasehold agreement, including taxes
and insurance (R. 612-613). He admitted that he made an
initial and constant assumption throughout his appraisal
that the actual leasehold rent equated fair market rent of
the Colonial Hotel (R. 611-612, 613, 643, 835). On the
other hand, the value witnesses for the owners did not rely
on the actual leasehold rent as the sole ba:sis for value
because:
(a)

The actual leasehold rental was not in their opinions, fair market rental (R. 338, 345-346, 392,
394, 481, 550) ;

(b)

Since the total property was being condemned
and not just the leasehold interest, the rental
from the whole property and not just a lease interest, was the more relevant data to be considered (R. 299-300, 343-344, 481-482, 500, 764769);

( c)

The actual lessee, Takanaka, was sick and not a
typical hotel operator (R. 488-489, 546);

(d)

The appraiser could not determine a fair leasehold rental until the rental of the entire Hotel
was determined (R. 768-769).

l~

The witnesses for both parties used practically the
same capitalization rate of return, the owner's appraiser
using a more conservative rate than that of the County
(R. 462, 616). Mr. Jensen for the County, also appraised
the Hotel on the basis of the cost replacement approach
(R. 666).
For the County, Mr. Kiepe admitted that the estimaterl
rentals of a hotel, as depicted by the appraisal approaches of the landowners' witnesses, was a recogmzed
and approved method for evaluating hotel properties, particularly, when it was determined by the appraiser that the
leasehold rental was not fair market rent (R. 749).
7. Cross examination of Jensen. On direct examination, the County witness, Jensen, testified that as a part of
his income apprnach to value, he used the actual taxes pairl
on the Colonial prope1-ty, $2500.00, as an expense deduction
from his gross income figure (R. 612). On cross examination, the witness admitted that the taxes were out of b<1lance anJ disproportionately high with respect to his gross
income figure ( R. 831), but in further testimony he indicated there was no imbalance (R. 831). Thereupon, Jensen
was asked whether or not the $2500.00 tax bill as used by
the witness was not, in fact, based upon a ma1·ket value
estimate made by the State Tax Commission of $130,000.00
(R. 831) . .Jensen answered he did not know (R. 8:11). Jrnsen was then requested to identify an exhibit (which wns
not shm,·n to the jury) with i·espect to the taxes paid on
the propel'ty, hut he \Yas unable to make the identification
i R. R~2). Ther!eupon, the examination te1·minatecl (R. 8:3~).
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8. Sale of Upland Hotel. On cross examination of the
()wners' witness, Loll, County counsel asked by way of new
evidence, if the Upland Hotel had not sold in 1961 for
$97,600.00 (R. 532-533). Testimony of the sale was stricken
by Judge Elton on redirect examination when it was shown
that the sale was from Tracy Collins Bank, Trustee, to
Tracy Collins Bank, as Trustee for arrother (R. 533-534.
557-558, 570). The basis of the Elton ruling was that the
transaction was a sale from a Bank to itself, and not an
arms length transaction in the open market (R. 557-558,
570, 674). Jensen for the County did not know whether
the transaction was an open market, arms length, bona fide
sale ( R. 67 4), and the trial court refused to permit the sale
as comparable (R. 675). The County made no offer of
proof whatsoever to show that the sale was made in the
open market, that it was voluntary, that it was the result
of normal bargaining and that it was otherwise an arms
length transaction between a buyer and seller in the competitive market (R. 675).
9. Other w·itnesses called by County. W. Kiepe, an
appraiser, was called by the County as another value witness. He testified categorically that he had never physioally
inspected the Colonial Hotel and that he had not made an
appraisal of the Hotel (R. 736, 751). The witness had appraised other properties within the Salt Palace area (R.
751). On the latter basis alone, County counsel asked Kiepe
if he had an opinion as to the value of the real property of
the Colonial Hotel (R. 751). The trial court sustained the
1Jbjection to such question and to Kiepe's opinion, the foundation for the ruling being that the witness, admittedly,
had not appraised the condemned property and that such
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appraisal was not to be conducted by "separating it piecemeal", the land from the building (R. 752). County counsel
made no of fer of proof as to what value, if any, the witness
would have testified if so permitted (R. 753, 776).
The County also called a Mr. McEwan, Fire Marshall
at Utah University (R. 721). The witness went on the condemned premises one month after the date of condemnation to make arrangements for fire-training courses to be
held in the Hotel prior to demolition (R. 722). At the time
of inspection, the Hotel was in the process of being dismantled (R. 722). The witness was asked by County counsel whether he observed the fire resistant qualities of the
building and its conformance to fire regulations of the
City and County (R. 722-723). An objection, based on
relevancy and materiality, was sustained (R. 723). County
counsel made no offer of proof as to what McEwan's testi·
mony, if any, would have been (R. 724, cl seq.).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT STAND
FULLY SUPPORTED UNDER THE ADMITTEDLY COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF THE
COST REPLACEMENT APPROACH TO MARKET VALUE.
One reading no further than the County's Brief in
this appeal is left with the distinct impression that the
evidence of trial, the verdict and judgment, all rest solely
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on the income approach to market value. Throughout its
Brief, the capitalization of income is the only value testimony as to which Appellant makes any reference. Appellant has failed by its Brief to advise this Court that, contrary to the intended impression, the landowners (indeed,
both parties) submitted substantial testimony at trial of
the market value of rthe Colonial Hotel, using as a basis of
oalue the cost replacement approach.
The owners' value witness testified at some length on
the employment of the cost approach, the source of cost
factors considered, the amount of accrued depreciation estimated on the building, and the depreciated value of the
building, $103,300.00, which when considered with and as
a part of the real property, $44,000.00, indicated a total
value of $147,300.00 (R. 448, 482-484). Such testimony,
exceeding by more than $27,000.00 the value of the condemned property under the capitalization method of valuation, was received without objection by the Appellant. And
the appraiser for Appellant also testified to and used the
cost replacement approach in arriving at his opinion (R.
666-668).
Although sometimes criticized as unsophisticated, the
cost approach has been long recognized as a proper basis
for market value in eminent domain, State Road Comm. v.
Bingham Gas & Oil Co., 21 U. 2d 66, 440 P. 2d 260 (1968),
In n Blackwell's Island Bridge, 198 N. Y. 84, 91 N. E. 278
WJlO), and such method, itself, will adequately support
a damage verdict and judgment. U.S. v. 2.4 Acres of Land,
l:ix F. 2d 295 (7 CCA 1943); State Department of Public
W:itks v. Styner, 72 P. 2d 699 at 702 (Ida. 1937); McGaw
\'. Maym· of Baltimore, 102 Atl. 544 (Md. 1917).
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Quite apart, therefore, from any evidence of the in.
come approach in the case at hand, the verdict and judgment is amply grounded on admittedly competent and substr-.ntial evidence of market value via the cost replacement
approach. And this Court will not order a new trial even
were it assumed arguendo that errors of law were committed by the trial court on other issues. Baird v. Denver
& R. G. R. Co .. 49 Utah 58 at 69, 162 Pac. 79 ( 1916); An·
derson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142 (1945). As
stated by this Court in Se ry v. Utah Fann Bureau Insurance Co., 8 U. 2d 021, 334 P. 2d 554 ( 1959) :
"No evidence attacked either the purchase or
salvage price, and on such unassailed testimony, the
court could have found the market value of the car
to have been $200 after the mishap, with a resultant damage of up to $2,095. Having arrii·ed at the
much lower figure of $1,446.92 in opplying one of

two tests for determining dama,qes, ichich test
proved ob,irctionrr.hle berause based on inadmissible
evidence, shouuld not preclude plaintiff f10m rrcouery where, on uncontroverted, admissible evidence, cani•assed in the light of an equally ef fecticl'
test for assess111ent of dama.r;es, plaintiff might
me1 it a far greater award."

The rationale of Sevy ·was further outlined by the
Court in Hales v. PetP1'Son, 11 U. 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822
(1961). While there was no enor committed by Judge Elton
in admitting evidence of the capitalization approach, as
hereinafter discussed, the verdict and judgment are in an.v
event fully sustain.ed ·within the substantial .framework of
the cost apprnach testimony rt.!ciuced at trial.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENTS, AS
WELL AS APPELLANT, ON THE CAPITALIZATION APPROACH TO MARKET VALUE
IN THE EVALUATION OF THE COLONIAL
HOTEL.
For Appellant to be heard in this Court, it has the
burden of showing that error was committed by Judge
Elton and that such error was prejudicial to the verdict
and judgment:

"* * * The verdict has been given some additional verity by the rulings of the trial court on
motions presented, including the motion for a new
trial. When such a trial has been had, the presumptions are in favor of validity of the judgment entered. This court is loathe to disturb it and will not
do so unless the appellant meets its burden of showing error and prejudice which deprived it of a fair
trial. We are not persuaded that it did so here."
Lemmon v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., 9 U. 2d 195, 341
P. 2d 215 (1959).
This Court has consistently held the "prejudice" in the
appeal sense requires proof that the verdict would, in all
probability, have been different and in favor of Appellant
but for the alleged error. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631,
237 P. 2d 834 ( 1951). Contrary to this mandate, the
County has shown neither error nor prejudice in this appeal. With respect to the only genuine point raised by it,
to-wit, the propriety of using the capitalization approach
in evaluating the Colonial Hotel, the authorities and precedent of this Court fully affirm the trial court ruling.

l~

1. The income approach is admissible in the market
value determination in eminent domain, particularly as to
special purpose properties.
Point I of the County's Brief is devoted to a general
disparagement of the income or capitalization approach in
condemnation. Indeed, its censure of the income method
and the dependency upon the Sackman speech suggests
that Appellant's claim is tha1t the capitalization approach
is not admissible at all in eminent domain "in the absence
of a constitutional provision or statute requiring a different rule". App. Br. p. 18. At the least, Appellant's argument assumes that the issue of income and income approach
has never before been raised in this Court, since it cite6 no
Utah precedent at all.
Not only does Appellant's argument fail to focus on
the motivations and plain realities of the hotel market
(which in this case indicate thait income potential is thr
lea,ding characteristic in the eyes of the hotel buyer and
seller) , but it fails to heed the admonition of this Court as
to the relevant factors which are and may be taken into
account in determining market value.R But more specifically, Appellant's argument on the income approach ignores
the plain holding in the recent ca:se of State Road Comm.
v. Bingham Gas & Oil Co., 21 U. 2d 66, 440 P. 2d 260
(1968) wherein this Court expressly gave its approval of
the use of the income approach in the condemnation of a
special purpose property, a service station and cafe. In
Binaham. in proving the value of the condemned premises,
•Weber Basin Conserv. nist. v. Ward, IO U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862
(1959).
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the owner relied (in addition to the cost replacement approach), upon the capitalization of the net lease and gallonage pumped at the station. The condemnor made the same
argument as Appellant does herein - that the income approach was not admissible in arriving at market value and
that in all events, gallonage was attributable to business
profits and management and could not be properly capitalized to determine value. This Court, in an undivided opinion, rejected both arguments. Speaking through Justice
Tuckett, it was held :
"In general, appraisers of real estate use three
different approaches for the determination to market value; these are: (1) the market data approach
or consideration of comparable sales; (2) the reproduction of cost at the time of taking, less depreciation; and ( 3) the income approach or capitalization of projected income.

''* * * The owner's appraisers used the
cost approach as well as the capitalization approach
in determining the market value. The cost approach
indicated a market value of the property taken
equal to or in excess of the value based upon capitalization.
"It would seem to us that in view of the special
use to which the property had been put prior to
taking and its location the most reasonable and
practicable method the trial court could use in its
determination of value was the capitalizaition approach."

With the authorities referred to therein in support of
the holding, Bingham is one of the leading decisions in the
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country on the use of the income approach in eminent domain. When the highest and best use of the property is a
"special use" for which its income potential is a prime considerntion in the market place, Bingham is applicable.
2. The hotel use of the subject property is special
within the "Bingham" definition.
That a hotel is a special purpose or use of property
should prnvoke no debate, not even from Appellant. Witnesses on both sides at trial agreed as to the special and
unordinary use. Unlike a typical building, a hotel is not
amenable to ready conversion to garden variety business
uses. Its floor plan, ·wiring-, plumbing and bathroom systems require adherence to the hotel use. M cMichaels' Apprnisiny Manual, Prentice Hall, (4th Ed.) 1959 pp. 248·
249. ln the sale of a hotel, the willing and informed buyer
and selle1· will, therefore, take into consideration those
factors which have particular relevancy to the special hotel
purpose, and such factors may not have any relationship
to those facto1·s which involve typical business property.
The key facto1· in the purchase and appraisal of a hotel
prope1ty is its income potential:
"Hotel properties are bought and sold on the
ma1·ket and new hotels are constructed and placed
in O})e1·ation, yet in both instances the p1·imary purpose is the producing of net income." McMicharl's
Appraisinr; Manual, supra p. 248.
3. Income approach of Respondents was fully supported and properly received by Judge Elton.
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In determining whether Judge Elton erred, as charged
by the County, in permitting the capitalization of hotel
rentals, the threshold statement of this Court in Weber
Basin Conserv. Dist. v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862
( 1959) is the guideline :
"We are in accord with what appears to be the
better view, adopted by the triaI court, that the
condemnee is entitled to the fair market value of his
property at the time of the service of summons in
the condemnation proceeJings as provided by statute; and that all factors bearing upon such value
that any prudent purchaser would take into account
nt that time should be gi11en consideration, includ
ing any potential development in the area reasonably to be expected."
Although Appellant might like us to believe otherwise, it is unable to advocate the total excision of the income approach to value in this case. The reason - because
the County itself used the method at trial. In fact, most
of its testimony hinged upon the income method. So what
Appellant is forced to argue is that all other analyses of
income of the property, other than that specifically adopted
by Appellant, are improper. And that is just what it claims
in this appeal. 9
The facts are that both parties relied at least in part
upon the income approach to market value. The Respondents relied upon the reasonable rental from rooms and
ground floor (exclusive of concessions, restaurants or
strictly business income) as its basis for the approach. The
Appellant chose to use a leasehold rental as its income
"SeB App. Br. p. 19.
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basis, although it was the fee estate in the property which
had been condemned. Respondents' value witnesses clearly

dcnird that leasehold rental in the matter constituted fair
market rrntal. While both of the income methods thus
used by the pa1ties have their proper place in the capitalization approach of special purpose properties, the appraisal
authorities leave no doubt that the method of the landowners is by far preferred in the evaluation of a hotel. In the
leading appraisal treatise, Encyclopedia of Real Estate
Appraisinu, (ReYised and Enla1·ge<l) Friedman, PrenticeHall ( 1968) p. 619, it is stated that with respect to the
appraisal of a hotel :
''The appraiser gives consideration to reproduction cost less depreciation, and to comparison with
sales of similar hotels, but he is especially concerned

wdh the analysis and capitalization of probable
future operating income or of rental income under
a lease. Problems peculiar to the particular hotel
or type of hotel under appraisal arise continually.

"* '' * Capitalization of net income from
actual operation of the hotel in the past may or may
not be a fair indication of its value. After careful

study of the hotel in its environment, the appraiser
estimates the net income that the property should
produce under 'normally' efficient management. If
the actual net income produced by the operation in
the past is well below that which reasonably may be
anticipated for the future, the appraiser may find
that the past record was the result of inefficient or
indifferent management; he may adjust his valuation upward if not to the valuation based on income
from normally efficient management."

The expert testimony of this trial concurred in the
Encyclopedia statement. And the reasonable rental pro-
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duction of the Colonial Hotel, was determined by Respondents' witnesses only after an exacting study of past rentals, occupancy rates, net income, eJ..'J)enses, and typical
management of the Colonial Hotel and other competing
hotels.
The expert testimony shows that if these owners had,
m fact, sold their property on the open market to a private
buyer, the capitalization approach which Respondents pursued at trial, would have been used by that private buyer
ancl seller in determining a fair sales price. Should they,
Hs the County contends, be foreclosed from utilizing that
vrry evaluation approach to market value because their
property was involuntarily placed in the teeth of a con'1emnation suit? The answer has to be no, not without doing violence to the cardinal definition of market va:lue10
and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The answer is as Judge Elton found it to be, that such intome rentals and capitalization approach of the Colonial
Hotel is admissible in evidence because it is the chief and
most fundamental element considered by the buyer and
seller in the hotel market.
4. The authorities fully sustain Judge Elton's approval
of the capitalization approach of Respondents herein.

The precedent of this Court, under the Bingham decision and a wealth of authorities otherwise, affirms the
discretionary ruling of the trial court. Public Market of
P0rtland v. City of Portland, 170 P. 2d 586 (Ore. 1946);
f'o1tnty of Maricopa v. Shell Oil Co., 84 Ariz. 325, 327 P. 2d
"'State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963).
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1005 (1958). Nichols on Eminent Domain, VoiJ. 4, p. 113
(3rd Ed.).
In U. S. v. Eden Memorial Park Assoc., 350 F. 2d 933
(9 Cir. 1965), unimproved cemetery property was con-

demned by the Government for construction of a freeway.
The owners' witnesses, over objection, utilized the capitalization approach on projected income of the cemetery in arriving at market value. In giving its approval to the capitalization method under the particular circumstances, the
Ninth Circuit held:
"In seeking to establish the value of the land
taken, Eden relied upon evidence of the capitalization of projected income, or as it is sometimes referred to 'the income approach'. The Government
assigns the introduction of this evidence as error.
"* * * 'Appraisers commonly think of value in three ways:
1. The current cost of reproducing a property less
depreciation from all sources, that is, deterioration
and functional and economic obsolescence.

2. The value which the property's net earning
power will support, based upon a capitalization of
net income.
3. The value indicated by recent sales of comparable properties in the market.

"* * * We conclude the Court properly admitted the evidence as to capitalization of income to
establish the value of the property taken."
Further authority for the use of income (other than
leasehold rentals) as a criteria of market value is found in
Sill Corp. v. U.S., 343 F. 2<l 411 (10 Cir. 1965). Therein,
the Government condemned the owner's interest in a Wher-
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ry Housing Project. While the parties agreed as they did
on the Colonial Hotel, that the income approach was competent, the owner claimed that it was entitled to capitalize
income without expenses because of the relevancy of the
factor in the market for that type of property. The Tenth
Circuit writing through Murrah, C. J., agreed with the
owner and sustained the verdict:
"We know, of course, that the law is not
wedded to any particular formula or method for
determining fair market value as the measure of
just compensation. It may be based upon comparable sales, reproduction costs, capitalization of net
income, or an interaction of these determinants.
The parties agreed in this case that the capitalization of income is the most satisfactory method."

In County of Maricopa v. Shell Oil Co., supra, the
Arizona Supreme Court approved the capitalization of
gmss income of a service station in arriving a:t market
value because the buyer, in purchasing station sites, commonly considers such facior. While the Sill and Shell Oil
<lecisions extend quite beyond the evidence and rulings of
.Judge Elton herein, 11 they are significant in this appeal
because they reflect the extent to which highly respected
courts have gone in approving capitalization of income
estimates where such factor was a material element of
1·ni11e in thr market.
In State of Arizona v. Wilson, 420 P. 2d 992 (Ariz.
1%7), a guest ranch was partially condemned for freeway
'

1

Respondents herein did not in any way capitalize gross income into
value. Rather, it was based strictly on net income, after expenses,
of determined room and ground floor rental.
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usage. The owner predicated severance damage to remain.
ing property on the basis of a reduction in the gross income of the property. The trial court permited the evidence over objection under a limited instruction that while
the evidence could not be used to show "loss of profit to
a business", it could be admitted as an element in determ.
ining the value of the condemned property before and after
the taking. On appeal, the Arizona Court affirmed the
holding and in so doing, pointed out the distinction between
the loss of profits, per se, and property income. The latter
is admissible where it is a relevant market factor:

1

"It seems to be the general law that in a con·
demnation action evidence of profits derived from
a business conducted on the property is too specu- '
laJtive or uncertain to be considered as a basis for
computing or ascertaining market value of property. However, the courts have consistently distinguished between profits from a business and income from the real property itself, which is considered to have relevancy as to the market value of
the land. Though this distinction has almost uni·
versal acceptance, the courts have had difficulty in
determining when income arises from a 'business' as
opposed to that derived from the intrinsic nature of
the property itself."

In approving capitalization of gross income, the Arizona Court went on to emphasize the inherent discretion
placed in the trial court in passing on this type of evidence:
"In drawing a dividing line between the two
types of income involved, we believe that consider·
able room for the discretion of the trial court must
be allowed. We see sufficient relationship between
the income from a guest ranch and the value of the
real property used as that guest ranch so that we do
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not consider the admission of the evidence in question to be an abuse of discretion."
Two cases involving the condemnation of hotels are
noteworthy. Regents of University of Minnesota v. Irwin,
57 N. W. 2d 625 (Minn. 1953) and U. S. v. 6.28 Acres of
Land, 64 F. Supp. 117 (Ga. 1946). In Irwin, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the capitalization of room rentals in the condemnation of a large apartment house and
rejected the claim of the Regents that such constituted
evidence of profits:
"It seems to us that because of the apparent demand for rental space in that particular location,
the rentals received from the rooms available for
rental purposes, with other elements would necessarily affect values placed on the entire property
and would be considered by prospective purchasers
in estimating the market value of the premises.

"* * * In determining the value of these
respective properties, particularly where income
was being considered, it seems to us that both the
buyer and the seller would consider these facts and
the income derived from each property in determining the market value."
And in U. S. v. 6.28 Acres of Land, supra, value witnesses in appraising a condemned hotel, relied on past and
estimated earnings of the hotel in arriving at market value.
The Federal Court held that such evidence was admissible
because it would have been taken into account by a buyer
and seller in negotiations:
''Both parties having relied upon actual income
as one of the elements to be considered in the determination of the issue of just compensation, and

28
having submitited evidence that the highest and best
use for the property was as a hotel, the testimony
of earnings was properly admitted."
All of the authorities cited herein are in full accord
with the holding of this Com1t in the Bingham Gas and
Weber Basin v. Ward decisions and sustain the rulings of
Judge Elton at trial. They do not hold and we would not
claim that income evidence or the income approach is applicable in every eminent domain suit. Quite to the contrary, it is not. But when, as in this case, the Court is involved with the valuation of a special purpose property
which has as its leading and most potent value element, the
determined income potential to be derived from a typical
operation of the property, the rationale of Bingham Gas
and the authorities herein cited are highly relevant and
critical to the market value Jetermination. To hold otherwise, would be to ignore a plain factor which the buyer and
seller would consider in a private sale of the property. The
Government will not be permitted to deny the seller-owner
fair consideration of that factor because it has resorted to
condemnation as a vehicle to acquire the property.
5. The argument of Appellant is without merit and
citations are of no precedent.
The County's argument on the capitalization approach
consists of three factions ( 1) that the capitalization method
followed by Respondents improperly utilized personal property of a hotel business, (2) that such income constituted
loss of profits from a business, and (3) that such testimony
was conjectural. Appellant's main reliance is on a 1965
speech delivered by J. Sackman, a condemnor-attorney from
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the State of New York. 12 Appellant has not cited a single
hotf'l case in its Brief to suppo~ its position. And the Sackman article is largely irrelevant, being devoted to those case
citations wherein the landowner has hypothecaJted a building on what, in fact, is unimproved land and then attempts
to capitalize an estimated income from the theoretical
building. Such attempts are uniformly rejeoted by the
Courts and are not herein involved whatsoever.
As to claim ( 1), Appellant is in error on the facts. The
facts are that the value witnesses of Respondents did properly deduct personal property in the Hotel from the capitalized income. The Hotel furnishings of the Colonial, admittedly, were not fixtures under the definition of this
Court in Statr Road Comm. v. Papanikolas, 19 U. 2d 153,
427 P. 2d 749 (1967), and were not appraised as part of
the just compensation a\rnrd. So far as the capi1Jalization
apprnach to market value is concerned, Respondents' wi'tne,ses took out of the expenses from gross income, a return
and deJH'eciation attributable to personalty (R. 369, 456,1S9). Appellant in its Brief has not referred the Court
to a scintilla of evidence to indicate the contrary. 13 It is
its \Ju rel en to do so.
As to claim (2), no testimony was offered by Respondents 01· received that even vaguely resembled loss of prof1

This speech remains unpublished by anyone. It was offered for publication to and declined by the University of Utah Law Review in
1%6.

' County counsel should take a look at its own income evidence as to
P<>rsonalty since its witness, Jensen, did not reflect in his rental income rakulations the fact that the landlord and not the lessee
hc·rein, owned the Hotel furnishings. Because the lessee would typically supply his own furnishin!{s. the same should be reflected in
thr lt>asehold rental normally payable. Nor did Jensen, in his gross
'"Ill multiplier. consider such personalty.
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its. If the evidence had been directed at business loss, the
damage testimony and claims of Respondents would have
inordinately exceeded the actual evidence at trial. Respondents' use of hotel rentals and capitalization approach was
proffered as a factor which the thinking buyer and seller
would weigh, and was no more a loss of business profits
than the evidence in income approach in Bingham Gas, or
the testimony in State of Arizona v. Wilson, supra, Regents

of Uni1;. of Minn. v. Irwin, supra, U. S. v. Eden Memorial
Park Assoc. supra, and the other decisions cited herein

wherein similar claims of profit and business loss were rejected. Appellant has not cited one decision involving
special purpose property where such evidence was determined as profit loss, per se, and hence inadmissible. The
County's argument on this point is a hoax, a worn--0ut
cliche made in the hope that somehow the words "loss of
profits", per se, will strike a magic chord resulting in a
new trial for Appellant. The answer is tha:t the realities
of the market place do not operate that way and neither
does the controlling law. Weber Basin Conserv. Dis. v.

Wa.rd, supra.
As to claim (3) of Appellant (that the testimony of
Respondents was conjectural and not based upon "realty
in the market place") a dispassionate review of the evidence quickly reveals its fallacy. Past operation of the
Colonial and operation of other hotels of similar class were
reviewed in detail by the value witnesses of Respondents and
subjected to cross-examination by Appellant. And Judge
Elton at several points, charged the jury that just compensation was not to be based on conjecture. The capitalization evidence being fully admissible, the issue of its weight
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and credibility was properly one for the jury, which
this Court will not disturb. State Road Comm. v. Stanger,
21 U. 2d ______ , 442 P. 2d 941 (1968); Weber Basin Conserv.
Dist. V. Nelson, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81 (1960).
6. Appellant's witness admitted and agreed with Re·
spondents that the income approach of Respondents was a
recognized and proper evaluation method.
Contrary to the lament of Appellant herein, the County
witness, W. Kiepe, testified that in the appraisal of a hotel,
capitalization of net rentals is an important market consideration and recognized appraisal method, particularly
when "the appraiser found thait the contraot rent was
either above or below what could reasonably be expected
in the market" (R. 750, 774). The value witnesses of Respondents had already in their appraisements, met the condition of Kiepe's statement, i. e., both found that contract
rental was substantially below the economic or fair market
rental of the Colonial Hotel.
7. Appellant, itself, used as its final basis of market
value the "gross rent multiplier".
The County has neglected in its Brief to inform the
Court that in its final correlation of market value opinion,
its witness, Jensen, used the gross rent multiplier as the
sule basis of value (R. 677-678). Under this method,
the determined gross income, without consideration of exµenses, is multiplied by a factor which the appraiser estimates from the gross income of other properties. The
caveat anJ danger attached to such method is quickly apllctl'ent - neither the gross income or the multiplication
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factor used reflect differences in the studied properties for
age, size, location, state of repair, or available facilities.
The gross rent multiplier is widely condemned in appraising circles as inaccurate and unanalytical. The Valuar
tion of Estate, A. A. Ring, Prentice Hall (1965) pp. 174176. Yet the County used this approach as its major and
ultimate test of value of the Colonial Hotel herein. It should
not be heard to complain of the far more relial11e,
authoritative and proven capitalization method employed
by Respondents.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE
COUNTY WITNESS JENSEN, ON ASSESSED
VALUE OF AND TAXES PAID ON THE
COLONIAL HOTEL.
1. Cross examination was pursued to impeach and
test the weight and credibility of the opinion of the County's expert, and not to introduce substantive evidence of
market value.
The importance of the breadth of cross-examination
was emphasized by this Court in State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263,
265 P. 2d 630 (1953):
"There is no other instrument so well adapted

to discovery of the truth as cross-examination, and

as long as it tends to disclose the truth it should
never be curlm"led or l1:mited. Any inquiry should
be allowed which an individual about to buy would
fed it in hfr: interest to make."
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Other authorities echo the Peek statement anj the
broad discretion ves·ted in the trial court in ruling on such
matters:
"The trial court has a particularly large discretion in allowing cross-examination of an expert witness as to value, because the object of such examination is principally to determine the credibility of
the witness and whether or nat he has taken into
consideration all the elements of value in arriving
at his conclusion." 31 Am. Jur. 2d 557, Expert Evidence §51.
To the same effect is Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. III,
p. 630 §992 (3rd Ed.), 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 188
§18.45 (2) (3rd Ed.).
County counsel claims by Point II of its Brief, that
Judge Elton erred in permitting cross-examination of the
County witness, Jensen, as to the taxes paid and the assessed and appraised value for tax purposes of the Colonial
Hotel. The only authorities cited by Appellant for the
claim a1·e those wherein a party has attempted to introduce
evidence of assessed and appraised taxation figures for the
purpose of proving substantive market value and are not
in point here.
The simple facts confronting the County's argument
on this issue are these:
(a) Appellant's witness, Jensen, on direct examination, in testifying as to market value by the income approach, specifically used the actual lease income as his gToss income, and also usPd the actual real
p1 operty taxes of $2.500.00 paid by Respondent as an
expense deduction from gross income (Ex. P-13).
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(b) Said taxes under Jensen's own figures on
direct examination constituted better than 30% of his
gross income estimaJte. Asked if the ratio of taxes
vis-a-vis his calculation of rental income was not out
of line, the witness first said "yes" and then on cross.
examination indicated "no" that they were in line.
(c) At that point, Jensen was asked if the taxes
which he had used in his appraisal were not based on
an appraisement and assessment of $130,000.00.14 The
witness answered he did not know whether such was
true. He then asked if he had seen the State Tax Commission evaluation schedule of the Hotel, and he answered, "no". Cross-examination on the subject thereupon terminated.
( d) County counsel had full opportunity on re·
direct examination to show the taxes were in line with
rthe gross income figures of Jensen, as Jensen claimed,
or to move for a mistrial if he felt that prejudicial
error had developed. He did neither.
Jensen had voluntarily raised the issue of taxes on his
examination in chief. It was crystal clear thereunder that
a serious imbalance existed between Jensen's gross income
figures and taxes. Either income was too low (if the taxes
were accurate) or the taxes were more than twice as high
as they should have been (if his income figures were fair
14

1t should be noted that the County in this case has never denied
either the truth of this statement or that these owners were, in fart.
paying real property taxes on the Hotel based on assessed and ap·
praised valuation of $130,000.00 Yet Jensen's opinion of market
vali1e under the income approach was $67,200.00 or about Vi of the
value upon which taxes were paid.
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market rental). An adjustment of either to bring gross
income and taxes into balance would have, in any event,
meant a very substantial increase in the market value of
the Hotel under Jensen's own appraisal. Having introduced
such testimony itself, Appellant claims now that cross-examination was not available to Respondents to get at the
root rancer of this inconsistency.
As reflected by the attitude of the trial judge, crossexamination on the appraised and assessed tax values was
not put to .Jensen to introduce substantive evidence on
market value. Rather, it was to test on cross-examination
the reliability and credibility of this expert's opinion whidh
had been developed on direct examination.
The precedent overwhelmingly supports cross-exa1;t;nation as a matter of right of tax appraisements under
th cse facts.
2.

In the condemnation case of Central Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Feldman, 92 Pac. 849 (Cal. 1907), the California Supreme
Court passed on the identical issue herein in the following
manner:

"The same witness, Feldman, having testifiel
on direct examination that in his opinion the property was worth $30,000, was asked on cross-examination whether he did not know that it had been
in recent years assessed for taxation at amounts
varying from $1,925 to $2,525. Objections to questions of this character were rightly overruled. Wh1'.le
the assessed value of property is not admissible as
original evidence of its market value, a witness who
has testified as an expert may properly, on crossexamination be asked what is his knowledge regardfog such assessment for the purpose of testing
the value of his opinion."
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Feldman was reaffirmed by the California Court ir
City of Los Angeles v. Deacon, et al., 7 P. 2J 378 (Ca!
1932) wherein it was said in a condemnation case:
"On cross-examination, however, questions ma 1
be asked about these various matters: Assessmer;.
and probate appraisals (citing authorities)."
In City of Detroit v. Ehinger, et al., 316

~Iich.

360,

~.·.

N. \V. 2d 516 ( 1947), the trial court refused to pennit th<
property owner to show on cross-€xamination, the asssess&J
valuation of the property for the current year made by tht
City on the condemned property. The )Iichigan Suprem'
Court reYerseci. holding the refusal to be preJ udicial error.
The Court ruled :
"The City fhed a culTent 19-!5 as.sessic:<l \"alua·
tion for parcel X ('. 15 c.S the O~i.S :0:1r 0Jbtaining tax
money for gove1"11Illent«d purp<:ises. Tr.e city no;'
seeks t\• obtain ti1e land ic._'<:i:. : :·r p 1J~'.i2 purpose,
lrhil< :i;t J9-!5 a."·~·:-~B~,.-i .·c:.::,.a .. ,~n .:-,.,._,. );,jf drt
111l11t !cit}; _iirwi.-~) .. {;_f .'rzir "'>-~~:_..~ . ll·~·,,; in thi.
co11do11 nation ca~c :·~ ,_f1.~·">: J-.c. ·1: n. ····:1:> · :'.~! 1_,~ 1.uing
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t<.ll!dt n: ~?(~t!·1..1n _:..P·~~,_~-:-"'.·._:·· .. : . . ."B. ~;.:- ·--=-~·-~:-~·~'=- --~- _·(duation
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and claimed at trial that the Hotel was worth less than half
of the basis of the tax assessment and value. Apart from
the l"ight of cross-examination because of the income approath used by Jensen in this case, Ehinger holds that such
n,idencc was properly received in evidence as an admission
,1gainst interest.
And in PCLckage Machinery Co. v. Commonwealth, 188
r;, E. 2d 871 (Mass. 1963), the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held in an eminent domain suit that questions running to tax evaluation and assessment were proper on
cross-examination to tesit the credibility of the expert:
·'There was no error. The questiorus answered
by the expert and the assessor were asked for the
purpose of testing the valuation placed by the expert on the land taken, and the evidence was thus
admissible even though it could not be received as
evidence of the fair market value of that land. (Citing authorities.)"
.T udge Elton in no way erred in permitting cross-ex-

amination of this most important element of Jensen's opinirm, lrnlc>ed, it would have been prejudicial error if Resp()11dents had not been allowed to so cross-examine.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR ON THE
LOLL TESTIIvIONY WITH RESPECT TO HIS
CON~ll>ERATION OF THE LDS CHURCH
TRANSACTIONS.
TiiP rc>maining issues disrnssed by Appellant in Points
111, l \', ;rnd \' of its B1·ief arc makeweight. In Ill, Appel-

I

1;1 ;11!..' 11('<

tl1:1l R(•sponrlents' pxpe1t, Loll, "aitificially ex-
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eluded from his appraisal * * * the numerous purchases of the LDS Church", and ergo, that Loll's opinion
should have been totally rejected by Judge Elton. For such
esoteric claim, the County cites an Illinois decision 15 wherein an expert based his opinion on severance damage in a
power line condemnation on "the feelings of the community", possible danger of wire breakage and other items,
which under Illinois law, are all non-compensable elements
of damage. Even if Appellant were otherwise correct on
the facts and the law herein (which it is not), one has to
torture the reasoning process to relate the Illinois case to
the case at hand.
The Appellant has misstated the fact of the matter.
Loll did not testify that he excluded the Church sales from
his value conclusions. To the contrary, he testified that
he did consider such sales but found in such consideration
that their circumstances did not reflect open, arms-length
transactions 10 ( R. 439, 466). Accordingly, Loll investigated
land sales in another downtown area. And it turns out
that the County witness, Jensen, did the same as Loll did.
Jensen did not use one Church sale in determining land
value, although he probably considered and investigated
the same. In fact, he went to the same area as Loll did for
his comparable land information. Under the County's
theory herein, the Jensen testimony should likewise be re·
jected for failure to consider the Church transactions.
tSCentral Illinois Light Co. v. Nierstheimer, 185 N. E. 2d 841 (1962).
H/J'here had been but one sale between a private buyer and seller in
the two hlnck, 20 acre Salt Palace area in the five years before the
date of condemnation (R. 439-443). Loll found this to be an uncommon market occurrence in rdation to other similar areas. Church
intluence in the sales Vvas also present (R. 437-439, 466).

The County is as well wrong on the applicable law.
The expert witness is not required, as a matter of lega:l
competency, to consider and weigh ea~h and every sale as
against all others, as though in a crucible. This Court has
left no doubt as to its repudiation of any such doctrine.
8.L.C. Board of Education v. Bothwell & Swaner, 16 U. 2d
341, 400 P. 2d 568 (1965) . The rule of this Court is that
the claimed failure, if any, of a qualified witness to give
significance to a particular sale or sales raised by the adversary goes to the weight of the expert's opinion and not
to its competency or admissibility. State Road Comm. v.
Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961).
The trial court was entirely correct in denying the
Appellant's motion to exclude the Loll testimony.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT, IN ITS INHERENT DISCRETION. PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
THE UPLAND SALE, AS OFFERED BY APPELLANT WAS INADMISSIBLE.
The Appellant next argues in Point IV of its Brief
that Judge Elton erred in rejecting the 1961 sale of the
Upland Hotel in determining value of the subject property.
County counsel first brought out the sale and sale price
before the jury on cross-examination of Respondents' exµert. The sale was thereafter stricken as comparable on
R..,spondents' motion. And Judge Elton later ruled against
the admission of the sale when offered by the County
through its witness, Jensen. The reason for the rulings of
.furlg-e Elton on the Upland transaction is clear in the rec-
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ord . . . the sale u•as from Tracy Collins Bank to Traty
Collins Bank, as Trustee for others. It was not an arms.
length, open-handed transaction between an independent
buyer and seller, each acting for his own interest in the
ordinary s'ense. At least, there was no testimony what.so.
ever to so indicate.
The trial judge has wide discretion in ruling on the
admissibility of an alleged comparable sale in eminent domain, Weber Basin Conserv. Dist. v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 29, 347
P. 2d 862 (1959), and that discretion will not be overturned
on appeal unless it is manifestly shown to have been clearly
abused. State Rood Comm. v. Peterson, supra, State v.
Peek, supra.
This Court, perhaps as well if not better than any in
the country, has spelled out the conditions required of a
party in proffering a claimed sale in evidence. State v.
Peek, supra, Southern Pac. Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306.
352 P. 2d 693 (1960), Weber Basin Conserv. Dist. v. Ward,
supra, State Road Comm. v. Peterson, supra, State Road
Comm. v. Woolley, 15 U. 2d 248, 390 P. 2d 860 (1964),
State Road Comm. v. Jacobs, et al., 16 U. 2d 167 397 P. 2d
463 ( 1964). One of those conditions is that the proffered
sale meets the typical standards of the market value defini·
tion, i. e., that of the willing buyer and seller in an arms·
length and open market transaction. State Road Comm. v.
Peterson, supra. A sale from one to himself, even acting as
trustee for others, is a misfit in such definition, unless
there is otherwise proof of typical conditions underlying
the sale. No offer of proof was made by the County as to
c,n1mu;f11n1·('s of Vvland.
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The County claims in its Brief that the Upland transaction was offered to show (1) direct comparability and (2)
as

a basis for the gross income multiplier method of Jens en.

App. Br. p. 30. The latter is a patent misrepresentation of
the record of trial. No such proffer was ever made by Ap-

prllant. Nor did Appellant offer to show the conditions anJ
circumstances of the Upland deal which would begin to indicate that such transaction was conducted at arms-length
and under normal competitive negotiations in an open
market. The burden of making that offer of proof and of
making· it clearly, is squarely on Appellant's counsel under
the holding of this Court in State Road Comm. v. Woolley,
suµra.
The balance of Appellant's challenge in its Brief of
the ruling on UplanJ are unwovthy of comment. Judge
Elton, in his discretion, properly rejected the evidence.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REJECTING THE TESTIMONY OF KIEPE AND
MCEWAN OFFERED BY APPELLANT.
1.

As to K ieµe.

There is no unce1-tainty as to W. Kiepe's testimony. It
wa ..., and is that he did not appraise the Colonial Hotel
Jirtlpert.v or any part thereof. But because he did appraise
other property in the Salt Palace complex, Appellant attPrnptPd to elicit Kiepe's opinion on the value of the physical land, alone, of the condemned prope1ty, without the
l1uildi11g·. Upon objection and sustaining ruling, no offer
1 r11·"()r w;\s m:-irle as to what Appellant claimed for such
1
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opinion or what Kiepe's opinion would be. The absence oi
such proffer alone, is dispositive of the whole question in
this appeal since this Court and counsel have no knowledge
as to what that testimony might have been. State Road
Comm. v. Taggart, 19 U. 2d 247, 430 P. 2d 167 (1967);
State Road Comm. v. Woolley, supra.
But in any event, (even if there had been a proffer)
a witness may not in eminent domain, legally appraise as
ultimate opinion the value of any part of the condemned
property, without also appraising the other parts. He may
in explaining his opinion and appraisal methodology of the
entire property, allocate certain values to the land and cer·
tain values to the building or improvements, but he may
not, as Kiepe attempted to do here, appraise less than all
of the property. What effect does the existence of the
building have upon the underlying land? Is the building a
detriment or enhancement to the land value? Is the high·
est and best use of the land inconsistent or compatible with
the existence of the building? Is the appraiser entitled to
appraise only that which he chooses of the property? All
of these questions must go unanswered when a witness
poses to testify as to only part of the condemned property.
And so the "unit rule of evaluation" has been adopted
without respectable dissent, by the overwhelming decision
in this country." 27 Am. Jur. 2d 94, Eminent Domain §291;
City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P. 2d 826.
The holding in Khnker was under a compensation statute
11County counsel claims in his Brief, p. 35, that he is unable to find
case precedent on the legal prohibition of appraising only the physi·
cal land of an improved property. For openers, we refer him to
better than 110 citations in 1 A. L. R. 2d 878 and Supplements.
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identical to that in Utah, 78-34-10(1) U.C.A. 1953. This
Court is in full accord with the enforcement of the unit
rule of evaluation. State Road Comm. v. Papanikolas, 19
U. 2d 153, 427 P. 2d 749 (1967).
Kiepe's testimony was introduced by Appellant as substantive opinion of market value of the condemned prope1ty. It is a ruse to classify it as "rebuttal or corroborating", as labeled by Appellant in its Brief. Even at that, ilt
,,·ould be inadmissible in law and Judge Elton so ruled.
2.

As to McEwan.

The fireman, McEwan, did not see the Hotel untH
more than a month after the date of value herein and then
at a time when the property was being dismantled for the
Salt Palace. On objection, the Court ruled that the evidence
was not material to any issue before the Court. Appellant's
counsel made no offer of proof as to what, if anything
McEwan might say, which faot precludes raising the question on appeal. Rasmussen v. Davis, 1 U. 2d 96, 262 P. 2d
4:-i8 (1953).
The only relevant date in the case is the date of service of Summons in establishing market value. 78-34-11
U.C.A. 1953. State Road Comm. v. Bettilyon, Inc., 17 U. 2d
13'1, 405 P. 2d 420 ( 1965). If there was a substantial
change in the premises after the date of value, testimony
!'elating to such change is of no materiality. State Road
C11111111. v. Valentine, 10 U. 2d 132, 349 P. 2d 321 (1960).
The McEwan testimony was correctly rejected by the trial
('•lllJt.
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POINT VII.
THE CLOSING ARGUMENT OF COUNTY
COUNSEL WAS AN ATTEMPT TO PREJUDICE A FAIR TRIAL OF THE CASE.
While Appellant does not indicate in its Brief the nature of the verdict or even its amount, or how it was preju·
diced by the evidence of trial, it is probably a safe assumption that its basic complaint is with the amount of the ver·
diet. That being the gravamen of its appeal, it may well
be that the remarks of Appellant's counsel in his closing
summation may have contributed to the result it now protests. Exceeding all fair bounds of propriety, fair play,
anJ the evidence, County counsel, in his argument, accused
Respondents' counsel of manufacturing testimony of un·
qualified witnesses, attacked the personal honesty and integrity of the landowners, accused Respondents of trying
to pull-off a swindle before an "inexperienced jury" and
of trying to "steal" from the jury, who also were taxpaying
citizens of Appellant-County:
"MR. NIELSON: And you heard Mr. Camp·
bell cross examine Max Jensen on the figure that
he used and how did he have those figures. It's because the landowner haJ those figures and that
price ever since the appraisal was first done. Now,
notice what was the effect of that. That means the
landowner can come into this Courtroom and say to
you the pl'operty's worth something diffe1ent? He
can say that it't' worth more money without anY
risk of ta!cinr1 less money. * * * He's got
everything to gain and nothing to lose. Now, how
is he going to gain? What is he going to gain?
First, he hires an <ippraiser and can he hire an
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M.A./. for this purpose? No. He has to hire an
appraiser without a professional "MR. CAMPBELL: Object to this, if the Court
please.
"THE COURT: Yes. We are reaching a point
here, Mr. Nielson, that the ladies and gentlemen of
the jury, it makes no difference as to what the
negatiations have been in regard to this property
prior to the matters that have been heard in evidence in this case. This makes no difference whatsoever.
"MR. NIELSON: Now, he gets assistance, service of an appraiser and then he tells the appraiser
the basis of the information that the appraiser
makes the estimate on. * * * Then they get a
nP1c and inexperienced jury and project that information to that jury "MR. CAMPBELL: I think that we're gtrtting
into a very serious problem in this case, and I ask
that that statement be stricken. That is "THE COURT: Yes. I don't know - I don't
know the problem about whether a jury is inexperienced or experienced. I would suspect that any
jury we have here has to be an inexperienced jury,
because we demand that they know nothing about
the matter, Mr. Nielson. I don't understand any
reference to experience or an inexperienced jury.
* * * You may proceed, I'm going to suggest
to ,1.·ou that you avoid that type of comment.
"lVIR. NIELSON: By this process, ladies and
!!entlemen, f}zp land01cnPrs are trying to induce you
to .<Jil'e thr:m more money than they're entitled to
for this prnpel'ty. They're trying to steal from you
b,1.r ove1·stating the value of their property; by saying that it's worth something a great deal more
th:rn they hm·e said th:1t it was worth in the market
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place for twenty-five years. When I tell my Board,
my clients, that what this case is about, they can't
believe that after "MR. CAMPBELL: I can't
your Honor.

~lieve

this either,

"THE COURT: Mr. Nielson "MR. CAMPBELL: This is impossible, your
Honor.
"THE COURT: Wha;t difference has any
problems that you have with your client got to do
with your argument? * * * I am going to
again ask you to avoid and let's stay to the evidence
in this case, and what reference you do have, what
remarks you want to make about the credibility of
witnesses, * * * I will anticipate that your remaining argument will be addressed to those mat·
ters. '1' * * Sir, you may go ahead.
"MR. NIELSON: This is just a means of projecting my argument, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: Well, I am just suggesting
that you are getting out of the area of a proper
summation. Go ahead" (R. 810-813).
That such argument would have been substantially
prejudicial if an appeal had been taken by Respondents in
this case, is not subject to reasonable debate. Garden Grove
School Dist. of Orange County v. Hendler, 45 Cal. Rptr.
313, 403 P. 2d 721 (1965), State Road Comm. v. Marriott,
444 P. 2d 56 (Utah 1968). But it could be that the trier
of fact in this case found such diatribe of Appellant as
offensive to common fairness as did the Trial Court
and the Respondents. If so, Appellant has no license to
complain herein.
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CONCLUSION
The verdict and judgment of the trial court are manifestly supported by competent evidence and in any event,
by the cost replacement approach to market value used by
witnesses for both sides. The capitalization approach of
Respondents and, for that matter, of the Appellant was
i::ompetent and admissible under the controlling case law,
and it was for the jury to weigh the credibility of the evidence. The rulings of Judge Elton on the cross-examinaLion of Jensen as to the basis of his taxes in the income
approach, on the consideration by Respondents' expert of
Church sales, on the admissibility of the Upland sale, and
on the testimony of Kiepe and McEwan, were properly
wnceived and made without error.
The verdict was a fair compromise and result, returned on the second trial after seven days of hearing.
Appellant has failed to show any error or prejudice, or
either, in the trial. Accordingly, the judgment entered
>;hould be affirmed, it is respectfuHy submitted.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
STEW ART M. HANSON, JR.
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Respondents

